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Towards a new multilateral energy 
architecture? 
Thijs Van de Graaf 
From climate change over peak oil to the 
geopolitical  scramble  for  the  Arctic,  there 
are ample signs that a global energy crisis is 
unfolding. The sheer scale and urgency of 
this  looming  crisis  calls  for  international 
coordination. Yet, even a cursory look at the 
existing  international  energy  institutions 
leads to a sobering conclusion: the global 
energy  governance  architecture  is  weak, 
fragmented  and  incomplete.  This  policy 
brief  discusses  both  the  flaws  in  the 
multilateral  energy  architecture  and  some 
emerging ideas to strengthen it, such as the 
proposal  for  a  Sustainable  Energy  Trade 
Agreement  and  the  new  American 
disclosure rules for the extractive sector. 
In  July  2012,  India  was  struck  by  the  largest 
power black-out in history. No less than 22 out 
of the country’s 28 states were affected by the 
outage,  comprising  about  10  percent  of  the 
world population. Ironically, millions of people 
living in the affected areas were not actually hit 
by  the  power  cut  since  they  lack  access  to 
electricity  anyway.  Even  for  many  other 
households  and  businesses,  the  effect  of  the 
black-out was mitigated since they are used to 
having regular grid collapses and have standby 
generators or other back-up systems. 
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This  event  exposes  many  of  the  energy-
related problems that governments around the 
world  are  struggling  with.  One  is  energy 
security, or the reliable and adequate supply of 
energy  to  sustain  a  country’s  economic 
development.  Another  is  energy  poverty,  or 
the fact that 1.4 billion people in the world still 
lack access to modern energy services such as 
lighting, heating and transportation. Since the 
grid fall-out was partly caused by a prolonged 
drought,  which  lowered  India’s  hydro-power 
capacity  while  increasing  demand  for 
electricity  for  irrigation,  the  event  also 
illustrates the likely effects of climate change 
on our energy systems. 
It  would  be  all  too  easy  to  relegate  the 
responsibility  for  these  three  challenges  – 
energy  security,  energy  poverty,  and  climate 
change  –  solely  to  the  Indian  governments, 
authorities and utility companies. To be sure, 
Indian  authorities  have  an  important  role  to 
play  in  addressing  these  challenges  and, 
indeed, many observers point to India’s poor 
energy governance system as one of the key 
culprits  of  the  power  fall-out.  No  wonder, 
then, that domestic good governance is often 
depicted  as  the  fourth  major  goal  of  global 
energy governance. 
Nonetheless, India’s electrical fall-out is but 
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one  piece  of  a  bigger  energy  puzzle  that 
manifests itself at a larger scale. Climate change 
is  a  truly  planetary  phenomenon,  oil  markets 
operate at the global level, technology transfers 
to  address  electricity  deprivation  warrant 
intercontinental  North-South  cooperation;  in 
other  words,  we  need  some  form  of 
international  energy  governance  to  effectively 
deal with these transboundary challenges. 
Currently, the energy sector is not very well 
governed  at  the  international  level.  There  are 
several multilateral energy institutions in place, 
each focusing on a specific set of energy issues 
for a specific set of countries, but there is no 
strong  system  of  international  rules  and 
regulations  that  puts  us  firmly  on  the  path 
toward  a  more  sustainable,  equitable,  reliable 
and affordable energy system. This policy brief 
illustrates the shortcomings of the current set 
of  international  energy  institutions  before 
surveying some of the emerging practices and 
ideas  that  may  pave  the  way  for  a  new  and 
stronger multilateral energy architecture. 
THE GOALS OF ENERGY GOVERNANCE 
ENERGY SECURITY 
Even  though  energy  security  governance  has 
traditionally  been  a  matter  of  purely  national 
governance,  various  countries  have  set  up 
international  institutions  to  coordinate  their 
energy  policies,  gather  and  disseminate  data, 
share  best  practices  and  manage  emergency 
response  mechanisms.  The  best-known  such 
institution  is  the  Paris-based  International 
Energy Agency (IEA), created in the wake of 
the first oil shock. Most of the time the IEA 
serves as a sort of information clearing-house 
but occasionally it captures global prime time 
when it coordinates a release from its members’ 
strategic oil deposits, such as it did last year in 
response to the prolonged outage in Libya.  
For all its merits as an oil market watchdog 
(and, occasionally, fire brigade), the IEA’s role 
in global energy governance is curbed in several 
ways.  Since  the  agency’s  membership  is 
exclusively  reserved  for  members  of  the 
OECD, emerging and oil-thirsty giants such as 
China  and  India  remain  outside  of  the  IEA. 
Clearly, the IEA cannot play the global role its 
name  implies  if  it  does  not  find  appropriate 
ways to accommodate these emerging powers. 
Another  challenge  is  that  the  IEA  has 
difficulties  in  shedding  its  image  as  a 
conservative  petroleum-focused  institution. 
Even though the IEA addresses energy policy 
issues  writ  large,  the  agency  is  still  widely 
viewed  as  a  child  of  the  oil  agitation  of  the 
1970s.  
Other multilateral energy institutions hardly 
fare  any  better.  The  Organization  of 
Petroleum-Exporting  Countries  (OPEC)  is 
commonly viewed as a small club of the self-
interested, trying to maximize the oil rents for 
the club members, while acting as a spoiler in 
the climate regime. OPEC meetings are often 
characterized by quarrels, members frequently 
cheat on their allocated production quota, and 
in the end, the Saudis nearly always act as the 
swing producer to balance oil markets.  
The International Energy Forum (IEF), an 
institution created to bridge the divide between 
oil consumers and producers, has some useful 
features. Biannually, it brings together a very 
large number of energy ministers and CEO’s 
of big energy companies to discuss the state of 
the oil (and, to a lesser extent, the gas) market. 
For the participants, it offers an opportunity 
for  having  numerous  bilateral  meetings  with 
colleagues in a short time span. The IEF also 
manages a system to bring more transparency 
to  oil  markets,  the  so-called  Joint  Oil  Data 
Initiative (Jodi), but since it is based entirely on 
voluntary self-reporting, the database contains 
many gaps and inflated numbers.  
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), finally, 
was designed in the early 1990s to manage the 
energy  (and,  particularly,  the  natural  gas)   3 
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relations  between  Western  Europe  and  the 
Soviet  successor  states.  The  treaty  was  never 
ratified  by  Russia,  Norway  and  the  United 
States. Russia applied it on a provisional basis 
before  formally  withdrawing  from  it  in  2009. 
The  ECT  and  its  Brussels  Secretariat,  which 
was conspicuously absent during the recent gas 
spats between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 
2009, clearly need an existential rethink. 
FIGHTING ENERGY POVERTY 
The widespread and persistent lack  of  access  
to  modern  energy  services  in many  rural  
areas  in  the  world  represents  yet  another  
set  of  major energy challenges, for which new 
international  governance  mechanisms  are 
needed.   
While  energy  poverty  may  seem  to  be  a  
purely  local  political  issue  at first sight, its 
sheer scale makes it a global issue. About 1.4 
billion  people  currently  have  no  access  to 
electricity in their homes, which is essential to a 
decent quality of life. An even higher number 
of  people,  2.7  billion,  relies  on  traditional 
biomass for cooking,  with  dire  consequences  
not  only  for  their  health  and  education  but  
also for  the  environment,  as  it  leads  to  soil  
degradation  and  deforestation.   
Energy  poverty  is  an  important  issue  for 
global  governance  because  it  is  of    critical  
importance  to  the  success  of  the  broader  
anti-poverty    agenda.    It    is  increasingly  
recognized  that  greater  quality  and  quantity  
of  energy  services  is required  to  meet  the  
Millennium    Development    Goals    (MDG).  
Indeed,    the    fight  against  energy  poverty  is 
often depicted as the “missing” MDG.  
The absence of a specific MDG for energy 
services is one clear indication  of  how  the  
theme    of    energy    access    has    long    been  
overlooked    in  international  policy  processes. 
Multilateral donor agencies such as the World 
Bank have  devoted  some  attention  to  energy  
access  but,  in  practice,  the Bank’s neoliberal 
structural  reforms  have  done  little  to 
incentivize the provision of energy services to 
the poor nor to reduce overall figures of energy 
poverty.  
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
Climate  change,  thirdly,  is  arguably  the  most 
defining  issue  of  our  time.  The  intricate  link 
between global warming and our energy system 
is  evident:  fossil  fuels  provide  80  percent  of 
global  energy  while  being  responsible  for 
almost  60  percent  of  global  greenhouse  gas 
emissions. Clearly, any reasonable global CO2 
mitigation plan must involve a reconfiguration 
of the energy sector, by allowing us to shift to 
low-carbon  fuels  and  sources.  Admittedly, 
some  observers  put  high  faith  in  carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS) projects, but 
given the cost and the fact that this technology 
is  not  yet  demonstrated  on  a  large-enough 
scale, CCS is far from a silver bullet to solve the 
energy-climate conundrum. 
With  only  37  industrialized  countries 
committing  themselves  to  reduce  their 
greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% on average 
for the period 2008-2012, it was obvious from 
the outset that the Kyoto Protocol was never 
going to be enough to stop climate change. As 
large  developing  countries  continued  to  grow 
(and  pollute)  at  an  astonishing  pace,  it  has 
become ever more clear that no international 
climate agreement can be meaningful without 
the  participation  of  these  emerging  powers. 
Yet,  at  the  same  time  it  has  raised  ethical 
questions about the differentiated responsibility 
for climate change and has thus stirred political 
tensions. 
Today the global climate negotiations are in 
complete  political  deadlock,  much  like  that 
other grand multilateral endeavor, the WTO’s 
Doha  Development  Round.  Last  year’s 
conference  of  the  parties  (COP)  in  Durban 
barely  kept  the  international  negotiation   4 
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process alive by extending Kyoto for a few more 
years. Durban made it clear that no post-Kyoto 
protocol will enter into force until 2020, much 
too  late  according  to  various  observers.  The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) has warned 
that,  if  the  world  is  to  stay  below  2  degrees 
Celsius of warming, then emissions must be kept 
in check to no more than 450 parts per million 
(ppm) of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; the 
level is currently around 390 ppm. If we do not 
undertake action, by 2017, we will be “locked” 
into  a  carbon  path  that  will  tip  us  over  the 
dangerous 2 degrees target. 
GOOD GOVERNANCE 
A  fourth  major  challenge  is  good  governance. 
The  upstream  energy  sector  has  always  been 
particularly susceptible to corruption because of 
the  concentration  of  hydrocarbon  reserves  in 
countries that have weak democratic institutions.  
Advocacy  groups  such  as  Human  Rights 
Watch  and  Global  Witness  have  issued 
numerous reports on the alleged complicity in 
the misuse of government revenues from oil and 
gas extraction by firms operating in repressive or 
poorly  governed  countries.  To  counter  such 
corruption,  the  United  Kingdom  spearheaded 
the  launch  of  the  Extractive  Industries 
Transparency  Initiative  (EITI)  in  2002,  calling 
on firms to publish accounts on what they pay 
to  governments.  To  date,  the  EITI  schemes 
remain entirely voluntary. 
Still,  as  Ann  Florini  has  argued,  many  oil 
companies do not shy away from doing business 
in countries whose track record on human rights 
is  less  than  stellar.  What  is  more,  some 
companies are accused of complicity to human 
rights  violations.  Shell  has  been  criticized  for 
alleged complicity in human rights violations in 
Nigeria  in  the  1990s,  the  American  oil  firm 
Unocal has been sued for human rights atrocities 
in  Myanmar,  and  Chinese  oil  companies  have 
been vehemently criticized for their operations 
in Darfur. 
FLAWS  IN  THE  GLOBAL  ENERGY 
ARCHITECTURE 
Clearly, the global energy architecture is unable 
to  provide  long-lasting  solutions  to  the  key 
challenges of energy governance. The relatively 
sparse energy governance institutions that exist 
are  fragmented  and  lack  authority.  Global 
energy  governance  consists  of  a  chaotic  and 
scattered  mish-mash  of  institutions,  rule-
systems, clubs and significant governance gaps. 
Within  this  patchwork,  there  is  hardly  any 
coordination  or  legal  hierarchy.  Universally 
accepted norms are missing. 
Moreover,  the  existing  arrangements  are 
limited  in  scope,  representation,  and 
effectiveness.  
•  Scope.  International  energy  institutions 
have  focused  predominantly  on  the 
expansion of energy markets and far less 
on energy access for developing countries 
or environmental protection. While there 
is  cooperation  on  energy  research  and 
technology, there is little sustained effort 
to fundamentally rethink the global energy 
supply  system.  The  energy  governance 
architecture is replete with narrow, sector-
based  institutions  that  tend  to  defend 
“their” sector (e.g., IAEA for nuclear, the 
IEA  for  oil/gas/CCS,  and  now  IRENA 
for renewables). The proper way to deal 
with the energy crisis is to switch the focus 
from  energy  sources  and  supply  to 
demand  management  and  “energy 
services,”  such  as  efficiently  generated 
electricity  for  heating,  cooking  and 
transportation. 
•  Representation.  There  are  few  energy 
governance institutions that bring together 
a  broad  spectrum  of  stakeholders  in  an 
equitable  setting.  International  energy 
institutions are often fragmented along the 
producer-consumer divide (e.g., IEA and 
OPEC) or they are dominated by Western 
countries.  Emerging  countries  such  as   5 
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China and India, but also the lion’s share of 
developing countries are generally not (well) 
represented. Organizations such as the IEA 
and the World Bank have been accused of 
having  an  obvious  Northern  agenda  and 
prioritizing  the  energy  needs  of  developed 
countries. 
•  Effectiveness.  Current  global  energy 
governance  arrangements  flagrantly  fail  to 
realize  the  four  outlined  objectives. 
Moreover,  the  fragmented  architecture  is 
not  well  equipped  to  deal  with  the 
interconnectedness  of  those  energy 
challenges. Institutions working in isolation 
seldom  discover  policy  synergies  or  deal 
effectively with trade-offs. 
NEW APPROACHES AND IDEAS 
In  spite  of  this  depressing  overview  of  global 
energy institutions, promising new approaches, 
practices and ideas are constantly emerging. The 
remainder of this policy brief will home in on 
four of them: the creation of IRENA, the UN’s 
SE4ALL  initiative,  the  plea  for  a  plurilateral 
trade agreement on clean energy, and the new 
disclosure rules for extractive industries. 
IRENA 
The  creation  of  the  International  Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009 is the single 
most  important  innovation  in  global  energy 
governance of the past decade. IRENA, which 
currently  boasts  an  impressive  total  of  150 
members, is noteworthy for two reasons. 
First,  in  an  era  of  stagnating  institutional 
innovation in global environmental governance, 
the creation of an entirely new bureaucracy has 
become quite exceptional. Its rapid negotiation, 
ratification  and  institutional  set-up  processes 
make  IRENA  even  more  remarkable.  No 
comparably  large  and  institutionalized 
international organization has been created over 
the past 10 years. 
Second,  IRENA  is  the  first  major 
international  organization  that  is  set  up  to 
navigate  and  hasten  the  transition  to  more 
sustainable  energy  sources,  in  all  of  their 
occurring  forms.  By  focusing  on  a 
transformation of the energy sector, it tackles 
head on the principal underlying cause of some 
of the world’s major environmental problems 
such  as  air  pollution,  acid  rain,  and  climate 
change.  
In  that  respect,  IRENA  differs  from  the 
large and growing body of international rules 
that has been adopted to manage the plethora 
of  energy-related  environmental  externalities, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by 
Ships (MARPOL), and many others. Even as 
those  international  environmental  treaties 
obviously affect the energy sector, they do not 
lead  to  a  radical  departure  from  our  current 
energy path. IRENA, by contrast, intends to 
do just that. 
To be sure, IRENA is no standard-setting 
organization,  nor  is  it  able  to  impose  legally 
binding  obligations  on  its  members.  The 
agency is not designed to serve as a framework 
for  negotiating  such  binding  obligations. 
Instead, IRENA focuses on the gathering and 
dissemination  of  knowledge  related  to 
renewable energy technologies and policies.  
Most importantly, IRENA will give a voice 
to the sector of renewables on the global stage 
and  act  as  a  cheerleader  to  spur  the 
development and diffusion of renewables and, 
hence,  the  decarbonization  of  our  energy 
systems. 
SE4ALL 
On the front of energy deprivation, things are 
moving too. The United Nations (UN) have 
declared  2012  the  International  Year  of 
Sustainable  Energy  for  All  (SE4ALL).  UN 
Secretary-General  Ban  Ki-Moon  has  put 
together  an  Advisory  Group  on  Energy  and   6 
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Climate  Change,  which  has  recommended  to 
meet three objectives by 2030: 
1.  ensuring  universal  access  to  modern 
energy services; 
2.  doubling  the  rate  of  improvement  in 
energy efficiency; and 
3.  doubling the share of renewable energy 
in the global energy mix. 
These recommendations were taking up during 
the  talks  at  the  Rio+20  conference  on 
sustainable  development,  held  in  June  2012. 
One important outcome of the Rio+20 summit 
was the agreement to integrate these three goals 
into a broader set of Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which are designed to succeed 
the  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs) 
in 2015. 
While this is a worthwhile endeavor, policy-
makers could also contemplate the inclusion of 
the three targets in an updated version of the 
St.  Petersburg  Principles  on  Energy  Security, 
agreed upon by the G8 in 2006, which could 
then also be echoed through the G20 process 
(e.g., put on the agenda of the G20’s Working 
Group on Development) and the UN General 
Assembly. 
GREEN TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
One of the big fears surrounding the spread of 
renewable  energy  sources  and  technologies  is 
that international competition in clean energy 
will backfire. The best-case scenario would be 
that  global  competition  in  green  technology 
innovation  will  lead  to  a  race  to  the  top, 
spurring the rapid development and spread of 
renewables. 
However, if countries are too much focused 
on national competitiveness, there is a clear risk 
of looming trade wars and green protectionism. 
There are already a lot of barriers to free trade 
in  sustainable  energy  goods  and  services, 
notably  in  the  form  of  domestic  content 
requirements for key components that make up 
a  sustainable  energy  system.  For  example, 
Japan and the EU have protested at the WTO 
that  the  Canadian  Province  of  Ontario  is 
stipulating  that  new  solar  and  wind  facilities 
must  be  built  with  a  certain  amount  of 
domestically manufactured components.  
The United States has in recent months also 
levied tariffs on Chinese solar panels and wind 
turbine towers because the Chinese companies 
have  allegedly  enjoyed  unfair  government 
support.  The  European  Union  (EU)  could 
possibly follow in the US footsteps. Moreover, 
Brussels has included airline companies into its 
Emission Trading System as of 1 January 2012, 
provoking much criticism from third countries. 
Many  countries  also  restrict  foreign 
investment  in  industries  such  as  electricity 
generation  and  distribution,  which  may  also 
hamper the rapid development of renewables. 
China  has  limited  its  exports  of  rare  earths, 
some  of  which  are  absolutely  critical  to 
renewable energy. 
These are but a few examples of how the 
unfolding clean energy race risks to engender 
new  trade  tensions.  In  order  to  prevent  this 
from happening, the ICTSD, a Geneva-based 
think-tank  has  recently  come  up  with  a 
proposal  for  a  Sustainable  Energy  Trade 
Agreement.  The  basic  idea  of  the  agreement 
would  be  to  overcome  trade  distortions  and 
speed up the development of clean energy and 
renewables across the globe.   
PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY 
In  August  2012,  the  US  Securities  and 
Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  adopted  a 
stringent  set  of  rules  that  require  US-listed 
companies  to  publish  details  of  payments  to 
countries  where  they  extract  resources. 
Previous efforts to create transparency, such as 
the EITI, were entirely voluntary. 
The rules, which were required under the   7 
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2010  Dodd-Frank  financial  reform  law,  force 
companies  to  disclose  — c o u n t r y  b y  c o u n t r y  
and project by project — how much they pay 
governments  around  the  world  for  access  to 
their oil, natural gas and minerals.  
This kind of transparency makes it possible 
to find the theft and waste that devastates poor 
but  resource-rich  countries. T h e  E U  s h o u ld 
now  move  to  adopt  similar  rules  as  the  US. 
Moreover,  the  G20  should  consider  the 
creation of a global standard for reporting to 
allow comparison of payments made by US and 
EU companies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This policy brief has identified four major goals 
of global energy governance: 
1.  providing energy security; 
2.  combating energy poverty; 
3.  addressing climate change; 
4.  domestic good governance. 
A  cursory  review  of  the  current  system  of 
global  energy  governance  leads  to  a  grim 
conclusion: the global energy architecture is not 
up to the gigantic task of bringing the world’s 
energy system in line with the above-mentioned 
goals.  The  multilateral  energy  institutions  we 
have at our disposal are too limited in terms of 
scope, representation and effectiveness. 
The  energy  governance  architecture  is 
constantly evolving, though, and often for the 
better. The creation of IRENA in 2009 was a 
milestone event that could make a real dent for 
climate change mitigation, energy security and 
rural  electrification  in  the  developing  world. 
The  SEC’s  new  regulations  on  oil  payments 
could be a real shot in the arm for transparency 
and economic growth in developing countries. 
And  with  Ban  Ki-Moon’s  SE4ALL  initiative, 
the  fight  against  energy  poverty  is  finally 
gathering steam.  
These are far from the only ideas on global 
energy  governance  reform  that  are  currently 
floating.  This  last  January,  for  example,  the 
Chinese  government  called  for  a  new 
international  mechanism  to  stabilize  oil 
markets.  A  few  years  ago,  former  Russian 
President  Medvedev  has  called  for  a  new 
Eurasian gas treaty to replace the ECT.  
As  long  as  energy  security  and  climate 
change  concerns  continue  to  top  the 
international agenda, the debate on a reform of 
global energy governance institutions will not 
wane. This provides an excellent opportunity 
to  rebuild  the  international  system  of  rules, 
institutions and regulations to realize the grand 
objectives of global energy governance.  
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